"Where is the European Union going ? The weakness of the French public debate today
and the difficulty of its coverage by the media "
by
Marc Bassoni, Lecturer
(Laboratoire de recherche sur les Medics, PInformation et la Connaissance
[EA 3240]
Ecole de Journalisme et de Communication de Marseille
Universite de la Mediterranee, Marseille, France)

Communication
to the 15th Association of European Economics Education Conference
Copenhagen (Denmark)
25-27 August 2004

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"The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations"

A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835) Introduction

The current debate about the future European Constitution has raised the thorny question of the allocation of powers and prerogatives between national governments and EU institutions. In fact, this institutional question has been the key issue of European integration since the launch of the European Economic Community. Many famous historical events are a proof to the lasting tension between federalist and intergovernmentalist opinions, between those who would like to promote a true European federation and those, on the contrary, who would only maintain a cooperation between independent and sovereign governments. Among these events, we may mention, in the years 1965-1966, the conflict between President de Gaulle and the European Commission around the increasing autonomy of the European budget ("the empty chair crisis"); in the same way, we may evoke the financial clash between Thatcher's Cabinet and its European partners in 1983-1984 about the amount of British contribution to the European budget ("I want my money back!", said the British Prime Minister).
At the present time, this question of the allocation of powers in the course of European integration is more important than ever. Two main reasons may be put forward. First, the birth of the single European currency in 1999. The present single monetary policy, driven by the European Central Bank, is seen by many as a step towards fuller political integration and therefore reinforces the debate about federalism and its implications. Second, the latter enlargement of the European Union (May 2004). The status quo in the present European decision-making process could be the main cause of inefficiency of an enlarged Union; this risk points out the urgency of a new appraisal of an efficient and wished-for European institutional framework.
However important and pressing this debate may be, we must nevertheless sadly remark that it concerns little or none of the French public opinion. However political (i.e. linked to the alternative and debated ways for shaping the City's organization) this debate may be, it seems nonetheless to remain a pure academic topic, separated from any democratic process. This

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the unresolved difficulties facing politicians, the educational system and the mass-media alike : all try to make European questions clear and, sometimes, to maintain in the public the pro-Europe ardour of the "grounding fathers".
In this communication, we will throw a light on such difficulties. Some of them are general (i.e. diffused all over the EII); some others, on the contrary, are typically representative of the French political and cultural context.
In the first part, through the main teachings of the theory of fiscal federalism, we point out the intrinsic complexity of questions related to the organization of powers in Europe. In the second part, we underline the traditional and existing gap between normative integration (i.e. the integration derived from the federalist theory) and positive integration (i.e. the integration actually followed by Europe during its specific historical integration process). This gap emphasizes the complexity stressed in the first part. In the third part, we examine the single monetary policy - and the current French debates about it - as a case study of this gap. In the fourth and final part, we try to point out the liabilities peculiar to French politicians and the media. In France, too many politicians still consider Europe as the best way to consolidate a declining national power : this traditional nationalist attitude does not help to feed the public interest in true European (i.e. supranational) subjects. Consequently, the media, prompt to follow the pre-supposed expectations of the public, support this apparent lack of interest and therefore miss their educational mission. As we show, this French political stand is unsustainable.

1.	Fiscal federalism : main teachings for tomorrow Europe

One of the main purposes of the theory of fiscal federalism (cf. Oates W. [1999]) is to determine the suitable allocation of public responsibilities between the different levels of government (local, national, supranational). In this theory, as W. Oates notes, "we need to understand which functions and instruments are best centralized and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government" (Ibidem, p. 1120). According to the Musgrave's classical typology, public responsibilities can be divided into three parts. Among them, we can distinguish those which are linked to the macroeconomic stabilization function, those linked to the income and wealth redistribution and those linked to the allocation of public goods.
A key teaching of the theory is to show that each level of government must be established

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geographical impacts confirm why the theory objects to two extreme administrative organization's forms : total centralization of powers and total decentralization. Consequently, the theory tends to promote a rule of distribution in order to determine the suitable level of government for each public function or policy. From this point of view, the theory forms the fundamental background of the European well-known "principle of subsidiarity".
The theory points out two important factors : on one hand, we must take into account the externalities and the scale economies derived from each policy; on the other hand, we must consider the degree of homogeneity in collective preferences to which each policy is faced. The more important externalities one policy produces, the higher the level at which this policy must be assessed; similarly, the higher the degree of homogeneity in preferences one policy meets, the higher the level at which this policy must be assessed.
As Chart 1 shows below, this apparently easy key of delineation reveals two cases of indetermination. For some policies, it is not obvious to easily determine the suitable level of government.

Chart 1 : The allocation of public responsibilities
between different levels of government
	Externalities	
	and	
	Scale economies	
			
	weak	strong	
Homogeneity	weak	Decentralization	?	
Of				
collective				
				
preferences	strong	?	Centralization	
This theoretical feature points out one part of the complexity associated to this kind of question. However, this aspect of indetermination aspect explains why there are so many differences in time and place, particularly in the fields of education and health.

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The other part of complexity linked to this topic is due to the problem of fiscal assignment. At each level of government which taxes are best suited ? As W. Oates quotes, "the difference in the mobility of taxed units at the central and decentralized levels has important implications for the design of the vertical structure of taxation" (Ibid., p. 1125). In the structure of taxation, the taxes concerning the most mobile assets or revenues must indeed be assigned at the highest level. The application of this fiscal rule tends to avoid the "vote with the feet" described a long time ago by Ch.M. Tiebout (cf. Tiebout Ch.M. [1956]).
In Tiebout's model, the consumer-voters are supposed to be fully mobile and well-informed of tax-patterns and expenditure-patterns proposed by the different local governments. Every rational consumer-voter goes towards the local community able to satisfy his preferences, that is able to deliver a certain amount of public goods and services with the weakest taxation. In this context, local communities are in competition and Ch.M. Tiebout seems to be very optimistic about the consequences of such a situation : "Policies that promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumer-voter will improve the allocation of government expenditures in the same sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge relevant to the location of industry and labour improve the allocation of private resources" (cf. Tiebout Ch.M. [1956], p. 423).
But in a context in which public services exhibit external economies between communities, such a competition may produce a perverse effect. Let us imagine two contiguous communities, A and B. The local government in A chooses a high level of public expenditure with a high level of taxation. The local government in B, observing the positive external economies issued by A, may be tempted to reduce its own taxes. Owing to this opportunistic behaviour, the local government in B satisfies its consumer-voters, without affecting their standard of living. Of course, this equilibrium is unstable. The local government in A will react. Confronted to this free-riding attitude, it reduces its taxes and expenditures. At the end of the process appears an inadequate level of public services in the two communities ("race to
the bottom effect").	j To avoid this negative result, two solutions arise : first, A and B must share taxes; second, A and B must accept the centralization of taxation. In this last case, as mentioned by P. Enrich,
we need centralization in order to "save the States from themselves" (quoted by W. Oates, in	M Oates W. [1999], p. 1135).
The current European debate about the harmonization of taxes on a very mobile capital takes place in this theoretical framework. This risk of an exacerbated fiscal competition between

1 The initial goals of the CAP are : 1 °/ increase agricultural productivity 2°/ insure a fair standard of living for

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European nations belonging to EU is today very high; the "race to the bottom" syndrome has always been with us.
In practice, the fiscal assignment problem contains very complex aspects. It is difficult to give a true account of the degree of mobility of each kind of asset or revenue; in addition, these degrees of mobility change in the course of time, forcing the structure of taxation to adapt itself continuously. All these complex aspects, joined to the problem of indetermination mentioned above, explain the intrinsic difficulty to mediatize the current European institutional topics through the model of fiscal federalism. This difficulty exists in France today and it exists too in every country of the EU. Furthermore, Europe as it appears now, is very different from other theoretical and federalist pattern. Europe as it is has a very singular shape, without any known historical antecedent. This originality is the second source of difficulty for mediatization.

II.	Europe's history matters !

The EU is not the result of a pure rational building-process or the mere application of a previous and visionary calculation. The program for European integration, as observed in the last fifty years, did not entirely take shape in a few brilliant brains; it did not originate from economic theory only. As a historical process, positive integration indeed followed a far different way from that outlined by normative theory (cf. Hagen (von) J., Pisani-Ferry J. [2003]). How to explain such a gap ? Three main reasons arise.
First, at the end of the 40's, the launch of the European integration process derived from a strong political ambition. At this time, the purpose was to support peace in Europe and to finally eradicate violence and war between the nations of the Old World. We must never forget that the European Defence Community's project (1952) preceded the European Economic Community's Treaty (1957). At the beginning of the 60's, a similar political ambition - that seems to he beyond the purview of pure economics - shaped the emerging Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Among its major goals', providing food security appears to be a key political purpose. As a public good, this kind of collective security involves subsidies to farmers, especially through prices support. In the 80's, the evaluation of the CAP's results has become however shaded. On one side, this policy has helped Europe to

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assert itself as one of the most important exporters in the world agricultural markets; on the other side, this policy has truly become more and more expensive, unfair and wasteful (cf. Gylfason T. [1995]). The difficulties faced by the successive CAP's reforms point out to the strong political backgrounds of this important and traditional European policy.
The second explanation of the gap between positive and normative integration refers to the method of integration drawn by the "grounding fathers". This method has got three main features : it is a functionalist method (i.e. the advancement of the integration process depends on collective ability to drive common policies in a few specific fields); it is a gradualist (i.e. the integration process develops step by step) and mixed method (i.e. the integration process classically tries to conciliate two different views of government, that is to connect the federalist decision-making process with the nationalist one). Undoubtedly, J. Monnet is the main originator of this well-known method (cf. Noblecourt M. [2004]). Thanks to this method, the European integration process is a true "path-dependent" process in which history matters. "The construction of the EU – A. Alesina and R. Perotti note - is the result of a delicate balance between two types of institutions and decision-making methods
intergovernmental institutions, like the European Council and the Council of Ministers, that provide a forum for each country's demand, and super national institutions, like the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice, whose mandate and authority transcend the individual countries" (Alesina A, Perotti R. [2004], p. 4). Fifty years after the beginning of integration, it is not surprising to notice that the way followed by the Europeans does not exactly correspond to the normative prescriptions of economic theory.
The third explanation of the gap evoked above is related to the maintenance, in the European public debate, of sovereignism as a super-nationalist doctrine. This point of view which tends to reduce Europe to a mere cooperative forum between autonomous nations is an objective impediment on the way towards fuller political integration. In France, public opinion seems to believe that sovereignism has got particularly strong and ancient roots in the United-Kingdom. This perception is not false (cf. Blair T. [20011), but it is largely partial. In France too, sovereignism is an important doctrine. In the past, J. Monnet and the federalists systematically opposed themselves to the Communist and Gaullist parties, who were both in competition in the field of the defence of national sovereignty. Today, things remain nearly the same, even if these parties are stalling. As June 2004 European poll reveals, nationalist attitudes are vigorous both on the left and right sides of the French political chess-board.
The "path-dependent" way followed by the positive integration process explains why the
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few responsibilities are well-allocated (i.e. consistent with fiscal federalism's advices); on the contrary, others are in contradiction with the theory's prescriptions.
Chart 2 : The effective allocation of public
responsibilities in the EU (a few examples)
Consistent examples	Inconsistent examples	Examples of cases	
prompted byfiscal	with fiscal	undetermined bythe	
federalism	federalism's advice	theory	
- Labormarlet policy	- Financial market regulation	- Defence policy	
(deoentralized thanks b weak	(decentralized in spite of strong	(decentralized thanks b weak	
externalities and weak	externalities and strong	homogeneity of collective	
homogeneity of collective	homogeneity of collective	preferences and in spite of	
preferences)	preferences)	strong externalities)	
- Competilion policy	-Research policy		
(centralized thanks to strong	(decentralized in spite of strong		
e4emalities and strong	externalities and strong		
homogeneity of collective	homogeneity of collective		
preferences)	preferences)		
As long as European workers' mobility remains weak, compared with the American context, the decentralization of labour market policies is justified. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of preferences in labour regulations legitimates this allocation at a national level. Alternatively, as long as a single European market is the relevant competition level for the majority of firms, it seems useful to centralize the competition policy.
Besides these expected cases, there are a few abnormal situations. The case of financial market regulation is quite confusing. National institutions are always responsible for stock-market regulation on the basis of rules which are not exactly the same in each country of the EU2; in the same way, national central banks or national independent agencies are responsible for banking supervision. However, the failure of Parmalat in Italy, at the end of 2003, and the financial scandal involved by this bankruptcy showed with accuracy the limits of such decentralized regulation.
As Chart 2 points out, the current decentralized defence policy does not correspond to a clear theoretical case. On one hand, defence policy may have strong externalities pleading the cause for centralization; on the other hand, defence policy always faces important heterogeneity in

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preferences (the current European debate between pro-American strategists and their opponents is a luminous picture of this lack of common consent) justifying the observed decentralization. In this case, the theory does not give a clear delineation procedure. The final choice of allocation only depends on political options and wills. In this connection, we must remark that doctrines on defence vary in the EU; since the end of the wars in the Balkans, the case for a true European defence, able to act without any American logistical support, has got a larger audience.
Some optimistic observers think that this move towards defence integration announces a fuller political union liable to complete the new monetary union. This integrationist point of view is highly debated. However, it leads us to examine the case of the European centralized monetary policy.

M. The imperfect European policy-mix

Just after the signature of the Single Market Act (1986), the European discussion about monetary unification became more animated. A. Alesina and a1h give a very good summary of the main debate's terms : "Consider the adoption of a single currency, that is the decision to centralize monetary policy. The benefits of scale concern the trade benefits of sharing a single monetary unit of account. Also, a single currency eliminates negative externalities arising from competitive devaluations. Certain countries may also benefit from importing monetary policy credibility from abroad. The heterogeneity costs arise because different countries may have different objectives for monetary policy, or even if they have the same objective function, their economies may be affected by partially uncorrelated shocks, so that the business cycles of the member countries may not be perfectly synchronized. Thus, the loss of independent monetary policy conducted at the national level implies costs. The choice of whether to centralize monetary policy or not depends on the evaluation of these costs and benefits, and in fact much of the pre-euro discussion about the pros and cons of the single currency can be described exactly in these terms of heterogeneity of preferences versus the benefits of scale and internalization of externalities" (Alesina A., Angeloni I., Schuknecht L.
[2002], pp. 6-7).
At the beginning of 1988, the French government made its contribution with the Balladur Memorandum choosing centralization for monetary policy (January 8). At the end of February 1988, the famous Genscher's declaration supported the French stand (February 26). On the
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committee the task of defining a clear strategy to move toward monetary Union (Hanover summit meeting of June 1988). A few months later, the committee issued its report which contained a gradual approach to building monetary Union. This three-stage approach has become the framework of the Maastricht Treaty signed in February 1992.
The key issue involved by the launch of the European Monetary Union in January 1999 is relative to the efficient organization of the European policy-mix. From a pure theoretical point of view, three organizational systems may be considered. First, the case for absolute autonomy of national fiscal policies : in this framework, independent fiscal policies are seen as the main tools for coping with any possible asymmetric shock. Second, the case for coordination of national fiscal policies which tends to avoid, among other things, the above-mentioned "race to the bottom". Third, the case for fiscal federalism which involves the creation of a true central budget.
Among these three cases, which one is the option held by the Maastricht Treaty ? In this treaty, the first and the third cases have been clearly kept out. Absolute autonomy of national fiscal policies may raise negative externalities. "When a member of a monetary union – P. de Grauwe says - borrows too heavily to finance budget deficits, it raises the interest rate in the monetary union and thereby increases the burden of debt in other member countries. Second, the higher interest rates produced by excessive borrowing by one member lead to crowding-out effects in the whole union" (quoted by M. Bassoni, in Bassoni M. [2002], p. 26). Also at the beginning of the 90's fiscal federalism was always seen as too daring a transformation of European integration. This in spite of the former Werner Report (1970), the forerunner of the Maastricht Treaty.
Does that mean that the second solution therefore prevails ? Not exactly. The Maastricht Treaty chooses the option for a constrained intergovernmental cooperation. The constraint is relative to the "Stability and Growth Pact" which embodies protections against bad externalities3. Respecting this limit for budget deficits, "Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council" (Maastricht Treaty, Art. 103/1) to achieve the Union's objectives. To this end : "The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority ... formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community, and shall report its findings to the European Council. The European Council shall, acting on the basis of this report from the Council, discuss a conclusion on the broad guidelines of the economic policies

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of the Member States and of the Community. On the basis of this conclusion, the Council shall, acting by qualified majority, adopt a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines" (Art. 103/2).
In fact, the constraint is misadjusted and cooperation too weak. For the present, the system of sanctions contained in the "Stability and Growth Pact" is as symbolic as the incentives for stronger cooperation between national fiscal policies. For example, at the end of the year 2000 and at the beginning of 2001, the Member States of the Euro-group (i.e. the informal meeting of the Finance Ministers of the euro-area) did not manage to force the Irish government to apply a restrictive macroeconomic policy, able to contain the inflationary risk, dangerous for the whole monetary Union. Nowadays, we may point out the same powerlessness facing the six countries of the euro-area with excessive budget deficits (c£ Chart 3).

Chart 3 : The weak fiscal discipline in the European Union
(2004 Forecasts, European Commission)
Country	Budget balance
(% of G. D. P.)	Country	Budget balance
(% of G. D.P.)	
France	-3,7	Austria	-11	
Germany	-3,6	Ireland	-0,8	
Netherlands	-3,5	Belgium	-0,5	
Portugal	-3,4	Sweden	0,2	
Greece	-3,2	Spain	0,4	
Italy	-3,2	Denmark	1,1	
United-Kingdom	-2,8	Finland	2,0	
Luxembourg	-2,0	EU 15		
At the same time, economic cooperation between the governments of "euro-land" has been indolent. The Ecofin Council (i.e. the regular meeting of the Finance Ministers of all Member States of the Union) and the Euro-group have shown their timorousness in the field of collective governance of European economic affairs. This lack of common ambition has two bad consequences : first, it limits the contra-cyclical effects of fiscal policies; second, it impedes the development of common infrastructures (transport and communication networks)

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growth. The delay observed in the application of former Lisbon recommendations (23-24 March 2000) about the promotion of a dynamic European knowledge-economy is a sad confirmation of such a vacuity.
On this basis, French economists and politicians strongly argue about the causes of today's weak European growth, compared with the American one (As Chart 4 shows, the gap between these two economies is wide).
Chart 4: The Euro-area's flabby growth
(Forecasts, Observatoire FraWais des Conjonctires Economiques,
Paris)
Country or area	A GDP 2004 (%)	A GDP 2005 (%)	
United-States of America	4,5	3,4	
Japan	2,6	1,6	
Euro-area	1,4	2,2	
Germany	1,3	2,0	
France	1,5	2,3	
Italy	0,8	1,5	
Some of them argue that the euro-area's flabby growth is not the consequence of imperfect European policy-mix. As G. Saint-Paul stresses, "growth and employment cannot be decreed : they are the result of transactions made by private economic acting powers" (quoted by C. Lhalik, in Lhaik C. [2004], p. 122). In this Classical point of view, weak growth is only due to timid or deferred structural reforms (labour market regulation, welfare-state's reforms, ... ) which negatively affect the efficiency of market-economy. These reforms seem to be all the more crucial as they are the key conditions for quick and efficient adjustment in case of bad and unexpected asymmetric shock. In France, for instance, such reforms are hard to be promoted (pension reform, health-system reform, ...) : they face strong oppositions from many lobbies and, in the short run, paradoxically create increasing uncertainty, inconsistent with an atmosphere of confidence.
On the contrary, some other economists, prompt to express in French public debate their

4 At the Hague European Summit in 1969, the EC governments appointed P. Werner, then Prime Minister of

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European policy-mix (Varii Auctores [2004]). In this neo-Keynesian perspective, the imperfect institutional framework derived from Maastricht Treaty has deprived Europe of any efficient ability to react to the post-September 2001 international turmoil. Contrary to the United-States or the United-Kingdom, capable of reacting in a contra-cyclical way owing to an expansionary policy-mix, the EU de facto abandoned any discretionary macroeconomic policy. "Once again – quotes 7.-P. Fitoussi – we butt against the lack of European political government and the following paradox : on one hand, we have federal policies (money and competition) driven by institutions without any political accountability; on the other arm, we have politicians without any true federal power" (quoted by C. Lhaik, in Lhaik C. [2004], p. 121).
The neo-Keynesian view is consistent with the former Werner-Mac Dougall scenario for European monetary Union4. In 1970, the Werner Report indeed planned to create a European "economic government", a supranational policy-entity with a strong influence on national budgets. Furthermore, this Report advocated developing the European budget as a tool for stabilizing the whole monetary area. In its wake, the Mac Dougall Report (1977) demonstrated the urgency of setting up a true European central fiscal policy, able to sustain the Wernerian monetary Union efficiently. It estimated the minimum size of a true central budget endowed with the power of stabilization at around 7 % of the European G.D.P.. The current European situation, with a budget's size around 1,27 % of G.D.P., is far from this optimistic scenario of the 70's ... Such a gap confirms the necessity for a deeper collective debate about the desirable strengthening of the post-1999 monetary Union.

IV. A pedagogical approach to Europe : the missing dimension in French public debate

Let us sum up the points we have made so far : the current institutional debate in Europe can be accounted for by general difficulties. Some are linked to the intrinsic complexity of questions related to the organization of powers in Europe. Some others derive from positive European integration which cannot be reduced to any normative pattern however complex it may be. In one sense, French debates about the European monetary policy and policy-mix

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illustrate such general difficulties. Let us now examine another kind of difficulties, typically representative of the French political and cultural context.

Contrary to a wide-spread opinion, the French political elites have not been pro-Europe in the federalist sense of the word. Between the end of World war II and the beginning of the 60's, only minority parties and a small number of key figures, for a long time caught on the French political chess-board between the strong Communist Party and the Gaullist movement, have supported an ambitious integration project. Among them, we can quote the Christian-democratic tradition' (R. Schuman), some members of the Radical Party (M. Faure, R. Mayer), some Socialists (G. Mollet) and some higher civil servants (R. Marjolin, B. Clappier, 0. Wormser). At this moment, all these pro-Europe leaders succeeded in engaging France into an original integration process owing to the "step by step method". Their pragmatism has been successful, even if they suffered some setbacks.

The European Community of Defence project is one of them. Launched at the end of 1950 by the French government, this project aimed at integrating the German army into a true European defence force. It triggered off a tremendous controversy in which Gaullists and Communists fought all together against the government's plan. R. Aron considered that it was the most intensive polemic since the famous Dreyfus affair. Finally, at the end of August 1954, Gaullists and Communists organized a barrage fire against the future treaty in French Parliament and definitively obstructed the process.

The main turning point in the history of French political attitudes toward European integration was Ch. de Gaulle's come-back at the head of French government (1958), some months after the ratification of the Rome Treaties. Ch. de Gaulle did accept the latter in order to respect France's signature. However, he wanted to block any supranational innovation derived from the application of these treaties. To obtain public support to its pragmatic rallying6, the Gaullist government justified its strategy by pointing out the purpose to "use" Europe as a lever to increase France's power and influence (Europe as a means, not as a plan).

If this new message surely helped some nationalist parts of the public opinion to accept the integration process, it nevertheless created two negative and lasting effects. First, it contributed to reduce every European topic to a mere question, i.e. how to defend French national interests. Second, it tended to exhibit the technical aspects of the problems in order to lessen their possible supranational political dimension. Gradually, this communication 

5 Nowadays, I Delors is one of the heirs of this political tradition.
6 At this time, the search for public support was all the stronger as opponents to Europe were numerous and

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strategy was brought into wide-spread use and was adopted by many politicians beyond the Gaullist circle.
Consequently, the political and fundamental debates raised by the "grounding fathers" were put into the background and public opinion began to take no further interest in Europe and its future. In fact, when confronted with a virulent anti-Europe position held by the strong Communist Parry and by numerous lobbies, the Gaullist rallying contributed to transform the emerging European proceedings into a purely French political debate. In other words, it failed to improve collective representations of Europe and to nurture any collective desire for stronger integration. The French traditional fear of national decline may have been a favourable context for such an occultation of supranational perspective.
This tendency for "nationalization" of European debates was particularly strong at two decisive moments : when President V. Giscard d'Estaing contributed to creating the European Monetary System (1977-1979) and when President Mitterrand supported Delors' major monetary unification plan. At the end of the 70's, the opposition of J. Chirac and the neo-Gaullists to Giscard d'Estaing's European policy could be explained by competition for leadership on the French right-wing of the political chess-board.
Paradoxically, we can remark that the more Europe has been pushed forward since the beginning of the 80's, the more negative the collective perception of the integration process has appeared. Opinion polls took up the same "cliches" : Europe is seen to be "too bureaucratic", "too distant", "too disconnected from real problems" ... Obviously, French politicians, in a large majority, have given up making any educational efforts in this field.
On this basis, the influence of the media has an amplifying effect. In their effort to cope with a strong competitive context, the press and TV-radio networks' first tendency is to follow the public. The information supply is therefore organized on the basis of supposed expectations from the public. If the latter is assumed not to be interested in a topic – Europe, for instance – the information supply, about this subject, remains weak. The more exceptional this kind of information is, the more persistent the public's lack of interest seems to be. In this case, the information system keeps up a true "vicious circle". To illustrate this point, we can notice that the first French private TV network – TF 1 – and the first French news magazine – L'Express - have no permanent correspondent in Brussels, the seat of the European Commission. Unfortunately, this kind of informational "vicious circle" exists in most of European countries (Nobre-Correia J.-M. [20041).
In order to follow the public, the media also prefer to deal with heavily-loaded emotional or

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media from their educational mission. For example, when the European Commission decided to lift the embargo on genetically-modified food (May 2004), French journalists' first tendency was to bring up the public's fears of new scientific opportunities. By doing so, they called upon some irrational opinions and entertained collective suspicions about research and development. But in this area the main questions are linked to the decision-making process : is the European Commission the only one to be blamed for this decision ? Which part of responsibility may be attributed to national governments ? Why did some of them leave the final decision to the Commission ?... It is a good case of a practical question raising the complexity of the European decision chain. Unfortunately, most of the media jib at explaining this complex process. The risk is therefore to appoint the European Commission as a bad and distant institution neglecting the sceptical national opinion. We may add that the super-nationalist parties adore this kind of "popularization" through the mass media in order to bring discredit on European integration !
Another interesting example of poor media coverage is the case of Turkey as the next possible Member State of the EU. Opinion polls reveal that the French public opinion is hostile to this enlargement of the EU (66 % of French people consider that Turkish membership is not desirable 7). The preconceived anti-Muslims ideas form the background of this collective opposition. In this context, rare are the French politicians able to challenge this opposition, capable of explaining the importance of such an enlargement and the necessity to prepare it actively. Following the general trend, as ever, is more comfortable and less risky in the short-term political competition. Nolen volens the mass media amplify this lack of true debate : by pointing out the Muslim tradition of Turkey and the warlike past of the Ottoman Empire, by connecting these topics in resonance with post-September 2001 concerns, they nurture fears and scepticism. Exit geopolitical analysis ! Exit also any deep consideration of Europe as a true regional power in a globalized world ! In fact, this collective over-valuation of threats from Turkish membership once again reveals the French traditional approach to collective questions, i.e. a defensive and suspicious approach. Maybe it belongs to the syndrome developed by some old strong nations having witnessed the slow and non-reversing decline of their national power.

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In this context it is difficult to devote media coverage to the current European institutional debate and the scope of the future European Constitution. Nonetheless popularizing today these complex questions through political confrontations and media pedagogy is more important than ever. If French public opinion is traditionally not interested in dealing with usual European issues, it is nevertheless expecting a new kind of information, richer and closer to the new agenda and the new prospect of an enlarged Europe8; in Paris, at the end of April 2004, R. Prodi described this agenda and this prospect in these terms : "a reinforcement of the political ability to drive the European economy is essential to cope with economic difficulties inside the Union and to contribute, beyond its borders, to regulate globalization" (Prodi R. [2004]). Confronted with the task, French political elites need to abandon their traditional vision of Europe, seen as a substitute for declining national influence. The time for ambition has come; the time to take up again the "grounding fathers"' visionary enthusiasm.

References

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